CRAI - Universidad del Rosario Koha › Detalles de: Forbearance as redistribution

Forbearance as redistribution

por Holland, Alisha C

Series: Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Publicado por : Cambridge University Press (New York) Detalles físicos: xii, 380 páginas Ilustraciones, gráficas ISBN:9781316626351.

Tema(s): Aspectos políticos -- América Latina | Justicia distributiva | Política y gobierno | Política social

Año : 2017

Existencias ( 2 )
Notas de título ( 2 )

Tipo de ítem	Ubicación actual	Colección	Signatura	Copia número	Estado	Fecha de vencimiento	Código de barras	Reserva de ítems
Libro	Claustro 2do piso	Libro	361.65 H734 (Navegar estantería)	Ej.1	Disponible		100158598
Libro	Claustro 2do piso	Libro	361.65 H734 (Navegar estantería)	Ej.2	Disponible		100158599

Total de reservas: 0

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Previo								Siguiente
Previo	361.613 C912 Crecimiento equidad y ciudadanía hacia un nuevo sistema de protección social	361.613 S181 Salud pública y discapacidad	361.613 S819c The cult of efficiency	361.65 H734 Forbearance as redistribution	361.65 H734 Forbearance as redistribution	361.65094 G884 Growth to limits	361.65094 G884 Growth to limits	Siguiente

"Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"--

"The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"--