TY  - BOOK
AU  - Bueno de Mesquita,Ethan
TI  - Political Economy for Public Policy
SN  - 9780691168746
PY  - 2016///
CY  - Princeton (Nueva Jersey, Estados Unidos)
PB  - Princeton University Press
KW  - Economía
KW  - Política económica
KW  - Ciencia política
KW  - Política pública
N1  - Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Summary of Contents; Contents; Policy Applications; Preface; For Whom Is This Book Written?; A Word on Tone and Technicality; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Three Goals; The Role of Models; Why Rationality?; I NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS; 1 Normative Frameworks; 1.1 What Is a Normative Framework?; 1.1.1 Private vs. Public Morality; 1.2 Utilitarianism; 1.2.1 Why Be a Utilitarian?; 1.2.2 Some Problems for Utilitarianism; 1.3 Egalitarianism; 1.3.1 Equality of Outcomes; 1.3.2 Equality of Opportunity; 1.4 Kantian Deontology; 1.4.1 Deontology and the Challenges to Utilitarianism1.4.2 Challenges for Deontological Thinking; 1.5 Libertarianism; 1.5.1 Why Be a Libertarian?; 1.5.2 Some Problems for Libertarianism; 1.6 Takeaways; 1.7 Further Reading; 1.8 Exercises; 2 Collective Goals; 2.1 Rational Individuals; 2.2 Aggregation Procedures; 2.3 Evaluative Criteria for Aggregation Procedures; 2.3.1 Transitivity of Social Preferences; 2.3.2 Unanimity; 2.3.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; 2.4 Arrow's Theorem; 2.5 Social Decisions Instead of Social Preferences; 2.6 The Public Interest?; 2.6.1 Only Two Alternatives: May's Theorem2.6.2 Ruling Out Some Collections of Preferences: The Median Voter Theorem; 2.6.3 Intensity of Preferences; 2.6.4 Agreement; 2.7 Takeaways; 2.8 Further Reading; 2.9 Exercises; 3 Pareto Concepts; 3.1 Pareto Concepts; 3.2 From Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvements; 3.3 A Model of Policies and Preferences; 3.3.1 Actions and Transfers; 3.3.2 Quasi Linearity: A Bridge from Pareto Efficiency to Pareto Improvement; 3.4 A Bridge Too Far?; 3.4.1 Limited Transfers and Distributional Concerns; 3.4.2 Non Quasi Linear Preferences; 3.5 Relationship to Cost-Benefit Analysis3.6 Are Pareto Improvements Unambiguously in the Public Interest?; 3.7 Takeaways; 3.8 Further Reading; 3.9 Exercises; 3.10 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.3.1; Summing Up Normative Foundations; II SOCIAL DILEMMAS; 4 Externalities; 4.1 Collective Action; 4.1.1 The Social Dilemma; 4.1.2 Interpretations; 4.2 Public Goods; 4.2.1 Comparison to the First Best or Utilitarian Optimum; 4.2.2 Interpretation; 4.2.3 Concentrated vs. Diffuse Interests; 4.3 The Tragedy of the Commons; 4.3.1 A Pareto Improvement; 4.3.2 The First Best; 4.3.3 Interpretation; 4.4 Policy Interventions4.4.1 The Failure of Persuasion; 4.4.2 Pigovian Subsidies and Taxes; 4.4.3 Regulation; 4.5 The Theory of the Second Best; 4.5.1 The Second Best Pigovian Subsidy; 4.6 Alternative Responses; 4.6.1 Altruism; 4.6.2 A Market in Externalities; 4.6.3 Ongoing Relationships and Self Organization; 4.7 Takeaways; 4.8 Further Reading; 4.9 Exercises; 5 Coordination Problems; 5.1 Coordination Failure; 5.1.1 Interpretation; 5.2 Coordination Traps; 5.2.1 A Basic Model of Coordination Traps: Investment in Developing Countries; 5.2.2 A Model of Bank Runs; 5.2.3 A Model of Revolutions
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