| 000 | 02954cam a2200277 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20181108110920.0 | ||
| 008 | 170307s2017 nyua b 001 0 eng | ||
| 020 | _a9781316626351 | ||
| 040 |
_aCO-BoUCM _bspa _cDoris Forero _dDoris Forero |
||
| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aHolland, Alisha C _994366 |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aForbearance as redistribution _bthe politics of informal welfare in Latin America _cAlisha C. Holland. |
| 260 |
_aNew York _bCambridge University Press _c2017 |
||
| 300 |
_axii, 380 páginas _cIlustraciones, gráficas |
||
| 490 | 1 | _aCambridge studies in comparative politics. | |
| 520 | _a"Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"-- | ||
| 520 | _a"The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"-- | ||
| 650 | 7 |
_aAspectos políticos _97310 _xAmérica Latina |
|
| 650 | 7 |
_aJusticia distributiva _918201 |
|
| 650 | 7 |
_aPolítica y gobierno _922032 |
|
| 650 | 7 |
_aPolítica social _922021 |
|
| 830 | 0 |
_aCambridge studies in comparative politics. _937524 |
|
| 942 |
_2DEWEY _a6 _cLIBRORESER _e1 _h361.65 _mH734 |
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| 949 | 1 |
_i33433123827119 _lMAL82 _sb _t55 _h33 _o1 _vCATRL/ELT |
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| 999 |
_c310926 _d310926 |
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